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Abstract  
Market mechanisms for forest environmental services are increasingly used for 
promoting environmental conservation, and their impacts on development are of 
considerable interest. In Costa Rica a national scheme of Payment for 
Environmental Services (PSA) rewards landowners for the services provided by 
different forest land-uses. We evaluated the impacts of reforestation under the PSA 
on local development in the North of the country. We applied a fuzzy multi-criteria 
analysis including socioeconomic, institutional, and cultural dimensions and based 
on the individual perceptions of landowners. The impacts of the PSA applied to 
reforestation are positive; negative economic impacts are balanced by positive 
institutional and cultural impacts. In most dimensions, the impacts on the poorest 
landowners are notably positive and generally higher than for upper class 
landowners. However, the short-term incomes of the poorest landowners decrease 
as a consequence of reforestation. This problem may engender negative outcomes 
and reduce the participation of the poorest landowners in the PSA. Positive impacts 
were stronger for landowners applying to the PSA through a local non-
governmental organization.  
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Forest ecosystems provide a wide variety of environmental services such as water 
regulation, biodiversity conservation, or carbon storage for climate change 
mitigation (de Groot et al., 2002). Market mechanisms for forest environmental 
services are increasingly being used for promoting environmental conservation and 
their impacts on development are of considerable interest (Grieg-Gran et al., 
2005). Implementing payment for environmental services (PES) mechanisms can 
be a way to achieve development goals and natural resource conservation, 
especially in low-income regions (Tschakert, 2007). In Costa Rica, a national 
scheme of Payment for Environmental Services, called PSA1 or “Pago por Servicios 
Ambientales”, was created in 1997 (Chomitz et al., 1999) that rewards 
environmental services provided by different land-uses or forest activities, such as 
forest conservation, reforestation, and agroforestry.  
PES for reforestation, or more generally the financial incentives for reforestation, 
have been widely criticized for their possible negative impacts on local development 
and environment (Bull et al., 2006). This debate has been recently reactivated by 
the inclusion of afforestation and reforestation projects under the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM) of the Kyoto Protocol (Totten et al., 2003). As for 
PES, payments for carbon under the CDM may contribute to rural development but 
may also create social tensions or have negative impacts on livelihoods (Perez et 
al., 2007; Smith and Scherr, 2003). 
The PSA in Costa Rica was created primarily for environmental purposes; however, 
secondary objectives include income generation and employment opportunities for 
rural populations, thereby justifying our study on the impacts of PSA on local 
development. In addition, development returns for PSA are important because 
funding comes from the national budget, international development agencies, and 
buyers of environmental services who see social benefits as the most important 
criterion of forestry projects (Sell et al., 2006).  
Research has been conducted on the links between poverty and PES. According to 
Grieg-Gran et al. (2005), three key questions are evaluated: (1) the ability of 
smallholders to sell environmental services relative to better-off stakeholders, (2) 
the effect of PES on the livelihoods of the poor directly involved in PES and, (3) the 
effect of PES on the livelihoods of other poor persons not directly involved in PES. 
For the second and third questions, Vogel (2002) applied a methodology based on a 
critique of the Sustainable Livelihoods Approach in Ecuador, and Rosales (2003) 
studied the institutional process of PES as well as the social and economic impacts 





various empirical field studies dealt with the environmental and social impacts of 
the PSA (Rojas and Aylward, 2003) and landowner participation (Zbinden and Lee, 
2005). Studies have been conducted in Central and Northern Costa Rica, utilizing 
focal groups (Miranda et al., 2004) or individual interviews (Miranda et al., 2003) 
for collection of primary information. 
Some studies are biased because “benefits are widely applauded, and costs are 
poorly recorded” (Grieg-Gran and Bann, 2003). Moreover, in some studies, the 
impacts of PES are not clearly distinguished from the business-as-usual course, as 
changes are not necessarily a consequence of the PES. In some studies dealing with 
the participation of smallholders, the prevailing assumption is that their 
participation should be increased because of the PES positive impact. 
This paper evaluates the impacts of reforestation under the PSA on local 
development in northern Costa Rica. We focused on the perception of impacts by 
landowners or key persons and on the diversity of landowners. We did not consider 
reasons for participation. This paper will show that (1) the overall impact of the PSA 
is positive; (2) negative economic impacts are balanced by positive institutional and 
cultural impacts; (3) both positive and negative impacts are stronger for poor 
landowners than better-off landowners; and (4) the support of local organizations 
improves the impact of the PSA. The hypotheses were evaluated through the 
application of a multi-criteria analysis with fuzzy set theory. 
2. Materials 
In 1997, Costa Rica established a national scheme of Payment for Environmental 
Services (PSA). Landowners can voluntarily apply to the PSA and receive payment 
proportional to the area dedicated to forest conservation and reforestation. Forest 
management had been an eligible activity until 2002, and agroforestry has been 
eligible since 2003. The PSA considers four environmental services: hydrological 
services, scenic beauty, carbon sequestration, and biodiversity protection (Chomitz 
et al., 1999). During our fieldwork in 2004, the PSA paid US$ 550 per reforested 
hectare during the first 5 years (50% in the first year, then 20%, 15%, 10%, and 
5% in years 2 to 5). In 2005, Fonafifo decided to increase the total payment and 
the initial payment for inversion, as well as the duration of the payment to 10 
years. Since 2006, one reforested hectare has been paid US$ 816 (46% during the 
first year and 6%yearly in the subsequent 9 years). Under both payment schemes, 
landowners must undertake to conserve the reforestation during at least 15 years 
(Fonafifo, 2006). In comparison, forest conservation has been paid a total of US$ 
64, evenly distributed during 5 years. Between 1997 and 2005, 89% of areas under 
PSA were dedicated to forest conservation. Reforestation reached 27,000 ha during 
the same period, representing a reforestation rate of 3000 ha/year.  
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Distinct institutions participate in the implementation of the PSA. The most 
important public institution is Fonafifo (Fondo Nacional de Financiamiento Forestal). 
At the national level, Fonafifo collects and manages funds received from a specific 
tax on fuel and from additional sources, such as carbon credits trade, international 
donors, local hydroelectric and agribusiness interested in hydrological services, and 
ecotourism business interested in scenic beauty (Rojas and Aylward, 2003). 
Landowners can apply to the PSA at the regional Fonafifo offices. Applicants must 
present administrative and legal documents, as well as a technical study conducted 
by a forestry agent, acting as an intermediary between Fonafifo and landowners 
and receiving a fee paid by landowners. In total, landowners support a transaction 
cost of 18% of the payment according to Rojas and Aylward (2003) or between 
22% and 25% including other taxes, according to Baltodano (2000).  
Some local non-governmental organizations (NGOs), such as Fundecor and 
Codeforsa, play an important role in providing technical assistance and reduce 
transaction costs by handling paperwork, a useful help for poorer and less educated 
applicants (Chomitz et al., 1999). The facilitating NGOs have been gaining 
experience and recognition in forestry issues by working with groups of small and 
medium landowners. For their facilitating role in the PSA, these NGOs receive a fee 
paid by landowners and representing between 12% and 18% of the payment, 
depending on NGO2. 
Our study zone, located in the Huetar Norte conservation area, was selected 
because it had the highest density of reforestation under the PSA. According to 
Barrantes (2005), more PSA funds were assigned to reforestation in this area in 
2004 than in any other area. The impacts of the PSA have already been studied in 
this area but with different approaches (i.e. focal group approach in Miranda et al., 
2004). 
This area, one of 11 administrative units defined by the Ministry of Environment, 
covers 7662 km2 (15% of Costa Rican territory) and is characterized by a humid 
tropical climate (average temperature between 25 °C and 27 °C and rainfall 
between 2500 and 4500 mm). The local economy is based traditionally on 
agriculture (livestock and cash crops, such as ornamental plants, citrus, or 
pineapple) but new activities, such as ecotourism, are developing quickly. Family-
run small and medium farms and large agribusiness farms coexist in the area. 
According to Fonafifo, almost 60% of the area was covered by forest in 1999, with 
reforestation generally established in pastures. The three most common species 
planted in Northern Costa Rica are Terminalia amazonia (Terminalia), Vochysia 






2.1. Method  
The impacts on local development can be broken down into a set of principles (e.g. 
economic, social, human, institutional, cultural) that may in turn be broken down 
into criteria and indicators (Munda, 2004; Phillis and Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001). 
We applied a multi-criteria analysis integrating fuzzy set theory (Zadeh, 1965). The 
fuzzy set theory has been used in many research and operational areas close to the 
subject of this article, for example, sustainability assessment (Cornelissen et al., 
2001), environmental impact evaluation (Enea and Salemi, 2001), or natural 
resource management (Bender and Simonovic, 2000). Fuzzy set theory enables 
researchers to deal with polymorphous and ambiguous concepts for which a 
straightforward quantification is impossible, to mathematically handle the reasoning 
for these concepts, and to produce concrete unambiguous answers (Phillis and 
Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001). The core of the fuzzy set theory is the concept of 
membership function. A fuzzy set in X is characterized by a membership function f 
that associates each point x in X with a real number in the interval [0,1], 
representing the grade of membership of x in the fuzzy set (Zadeh, 1965). 
Our methodology included four main steps: (1) development of a set of PCI 
(Principles, Criteria, and Indicators), (2) fieldwork, (3) data analysis, and (4) 
statistical analysis. In Step 1, we developed a set of PCI to evaluate the impacts of 
PSA and reforestation on local development. Initially we revised and adjusted 
similar sets of existing PCI, e.g. by CIFOR (Prabhu et al., 1998), during two 
meetings with experts in rural development and forestry issues from the Tropical 
Agricultural Research Education Center (CATIE) in Costa Rica.3 The experts 
reviewed the set, adapted it to local conditions and issues, then weighted the 
adapted set. The weights represent the importance of each principle, criterion, or 
indicator for evaluating the impacts, and not the possibility of trade-off between 
dimensions (Munda, 2004). The five principles were assigned weights summing 
100, and then the same procedure was applied to the criteria within a principle and 
to the indicators within a criterion. The relative weights of each elements of the set 








Table 1 Set of principles, criteria, and indicators 
Principle, criterion, or indicator (relative weight in %) 
P1. Reforestation under PSA increases landowner socioeconomic well being (30.7%) 
 C11. It increases income (17.4%) 
  I111. It increases short-term income (10.2%) 
  I112. It increases medium and long-term income (7.3%) 
 C12. It reduces economic risk (13.2%) 
  I121. It increases diversification of activities (3.0%) 
  I122. It increases landowner credibility when soliciting credit (3.8%) 
  I123. It decreases economic vulnerability because of increased assets and regular payments 
(2.8%) 
  I124. It facilitates farm products marketing, especially forest products (3.6%) 
P2. Reforestation under PSA increases socioeconomic well being of indirect beneficiaries 
(21.2%) 
 C21. It improves employment (9.3%) 
  I211. It increases the number of workers on the farm (4.3%) 
  I212. It improves work conditions on the farm (2.3%) 
  I213. It creates new jobs in the transportation and transformation of forest products (2.7%) 
 C22. It reduces the social consequences of land concentration (5.4%) 
  I221. It reduces land concentration (2.7%) 
  I222. It reduces conflicts and forced migration due to changes in land tenure (2.7%) 
 C23. It improves social and economic conditions of the area (6.4%) 
  I231. It improves the social infrastructure in the area (3.6%) 
  I232. It affects positively the other productive activities in the area (2.8%) 
P3. Reforestation under PSA strengthens relationships between landowner and institutions 
(17.6%) 
 C31. It facilitates land title legalization (8.5%) 
  I311. It motivates the landowner to regularize land tenure and get titles (4.0%) 
  I312. It increases the protection of landowner rights (4.5%) 
 C32. It improves relationships between the landowner and local or national organizations (9.1%) 
  I321. It helps the landowner receive support from local or national organizations (5.4%) 
  I322. It reduces conflicts between beneficiary and local or national organizations (3.7%) 
P4. Reforestation under PSA strengthens forestry sector institutions (17.9%) 
 C41. It strengthens public forestry organizations (7.1%) 
  I411. It improves public organizations assets (human capacities and physical infrastructure) 
(3.9%) 
  I412. It helps public organizations receive additional funds (3.2%) 
 C42. It strengthens the NGOs by increasing their usefulness (5.1%) 
  I421. It increases NGO services demand (2.5%) 
  I422. It creates incentives for NGOs to improve the quality of their services (2.6%) 
 C43. It facilitates law enforcement (5.7%) 
  I431. It forces stakeholders to respect the law (2.6%) 
  I432. It facilitates law enforcement monitoring (3.1%) 
P5. Reforestation under PSA improves landowner perception on environment and forest 
(12.7%) 
 C51. It raises landowner awareness about forest ecosystems goods and services (6.3%) 
  I511. It increases landowner satisfaction of forest ecosystems goods and services (3.3%) 
  I512. It promotes landowner adoption of sustainable practices (3.0%) 
 C52. It incites the landowner to protect forest resources (6.4%) 
  I521. It incites the landowner to continue with reforestation, even without payment (3.5%) 




During Step 2, we applied the PCI set in a field setting. First, indicators were 
converted into questions for guiding interviews. To evaluate the impact of the PSA, 
we compared the current situation with the baseline situation that would have 
occurred without the PSA, i.e. without reforestation or payment (in all cases, 
landowners declared that they would not have reforested without the PSA). We 
asked to landowners how their situation had changed since the beginning of the 
PSA and whether reported changes were due to reforestation under the PSA. For 
instance, the indicator about impacts on the short-term incomes was evaluated by 
a first question about how the landowners perceived income changes due to the 
reforestation and the payment during the first years of the plantation and then by 
secondary questions about how much money was invested, lost, and received 
because of PSA.  
In 2004, we conducted semi-structured interviews with 37 of the 132 landowners 
receiving PSA for reforestation in the area (see a description of the sample in Table 
2). The sampling was stratified according to farm areas and landowner main 
activities. Due to constraints on landowner availability and accessibility, it was not 
possible to reach a sampling intensity higher than 28%. Other sources of 
information included 14 interviews with representatives of NGOs, regional offices of 
the Ministry of Environment, and small wood transformation industries. 
 
Table 2 Sample description 
Landowner characteristics N 








All landowners 37 93 (69) 52% (35%) 
Farmers 9 105 (65) 55% (43%) 
Working class (drivers, 
teachers, carpenters, social 
workers, domestic workers) 
12  70 (59) 53% (32%) 
Upper class (lawyers, 
businessmen, engineers) 
8 76 (47) 51% (27%) 
Agribusinesses (forest and 
agriculture companies) 
8 131 (94) 49% (42%)  
 
In a multi-criteria analysis, giving exact values to indicators may be difficult when 
indicators have not been measured quantitatively or are ambiguous (Phillis and 
Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001). Instead of assigning a single impact value, we 
recognized that the border between positive and negative impactswas not sharp 
and considered degrees of positive or negative possibility (Phillis and 
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Andriantiatsaholiniaina, 2001). Moreover, problems may arise from the aggregation 
of the indicators into a single impact valuation. Even if stakeholders agree about 
weights, the aggregation approach could be a subject of dissonance due to a 
continuum of approaches from very conservative to very liberal. Here an example is 
given regarding the aggregation of two indicators, I111 “increases in short-term 
incomes” and I112 “increases in long-term incomes”, into criterion C11 “increases 
in incomes”. For a very conservative approach, incomes are considered to increase 
if both short-term and long-term incomes increase. In the general case, this means 
that no trade-off is allowed: only the best situations with all positive indicators 
would result in a positive overall evaluation. The degree µ of membership of C11 in 
the set of positive impacts is the smallest degree of membership of indicators µ1 or 
µ2 in the set of positive impacts. In fuzzy set theory, this operation is an 
intersection and is calculated by applying the minimum operator: µ=min(µ1, µ2). 
For a very liberal approach, incomes are considered to increase if short-term OR 
long-term incomes increase. In the general case, this means that trade-off is 
extreme: a single positive indicator can balance the other negative indicators and 
result in a positive overall evaluation. This operation is a union and is calculated 
with the maximum operator: µ=max(µ1, µ2) (Dubois and Prade, 1998). 
Intermediate approaches may also be imagined, in which high values of some 
indicators may compensate low value of others (Cornelissen et al., 2001) and the 
degree of trade-off may vary. A parameter α for the degree of trade-off can vary 
between positive infinity for a liberal approach and negative infinity for a 
conservative approach. A general equation for aggregation is the following:  
 
If we consider n elements to be aggregated with weights (wk are the weights, k=1 
to n), the aggregation is calculated with the following equation (Grabisch et al., 




During Step 3, we analyzed the field data by converting each observation into a 
value between -1 and +1. To avoid personal interpretations of the field data, the 
two authors conducted separate analyses, compared their findings, and reached 
consensus. With a fuzzification process, each indicator value was converted into two 
degrees of membership in the sets of positive and negative impacts by using 
sigmoid functions (see Fig. 1).  
 
Fig. 1. Membership functions in the sets of positive and negative impacts. 
 
Fig. 2 shows an example of fuzzy inference (Cornelissen et al., 2001) for two 
indicators and one criterion, in the case of a liberal approach. If the degrees of 
membership of I1 and I2 in the set of the positive impacts are 0.04 and 0.23 
respectively, the truth-value of the premise “I1 is positive or I2 is positive” is the 
maximum of 0.04 and 0.23 because of the logical connective OR. As a 
consequence, the conclusion “C is positive” has a truth-value of 0.23 (graphs a to 
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c). The same procedure is applied to negative impacts, utilizing the minimum 
operator for the logical connective AND, because the rule for negative impacts 
always uses the connective opposite to that of the positive rule (d to f). An overall 
fuzzy conclusion is drawn using the union of the two partial conclusions. A 
defuzzification process reaches an unambiguous impact value with the center of 
gravity method (g).  
 
 
Fig. 2. Fuzzy inference and defuzzification in the case of two fuzzy rules for 
aggregating two indicators I1 and I2 in one criterion C.  
 
For each landowner, the fuzzy inferences were subsequently applied for aggregating 
indicators into criterion, criteria into principle, and principles into overall evaluation. 
They were applied with seven distinct approaches from conservative to liberal. We 
used a linear correction so that the impact value would be +1 for a “best” 
landowner with all positive impacts, 0 for a “null” landowner with all null impacts, 
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and -1 for a “worst” landowner with all negative impacts. All calculations were done 
with Matlab™. 
In Step 4 statistical t-tests (p<0.05) were used to assess whether the average 
impact for each principle or criteria was significantly different from 0. When 
significant, the average impact based on the balanced approach (α=0) was 
reported qualitatively: Null (between -0.05 and 0.05), Moderately Negative or 
Positive (between 0.05 and 0.25 in absolute value), Negative or Positive (0.25–
0.5), Very Negative or Positive (0.5– 0.75), Highly Negative or Positive (0.75–1).  
Using t-tests, we looked for impact differences between groups of landowners: 
farmers, working class, upper class, and agribusiness (see Table 2 for group 
description). Other comparisons were made between landowners applying to PSA 
through local organization (n=16) and others. Some groups were defined by 
degrees of membership (see Fig. 3 and Table 3). When applying t-tests we 
considered fuzzy memberships as weights to compute weighted averages, standard 
deviations, and sample size.  
 
Table 3. Fuzzy definition of landowner groups 
Landowner group and size Fuzzy definition (µ=degree of membership) 
Small farm (∑µ=14.74), 
Medium farm (∑µ=9.26), 
Large farm (∑µ=13.00) 
Based on farm area (See Fig. 3) with 40, 90, and 
140 ha as thresholds. Thresholds were based on 
percentiles of the distribution of farm areas. 
Small farmer (∑µ=2.82)  µ(Small farm) if landowner is a farmer  
Large farmer (∑µ=4.23) µ(Large farm) if landowner is a farmer 
Depending on farm for 
livelihoods (∑µ=15) 
µ=1: Farmers (agriculture or livestock), µ=0.5: 
working class (driver, teacher, carpenter, social 





Fig. 3. Degree of membership µ in the sets of small, medium, and large farms. 
 
Finally, to test the robustness of the conclusions, we applied a sensitivity analysis 
(Munda, 2004). We performed 100 calculations with all weights modified by a 
random factor between -50% and +50% and we obtained the standard deviation of 
the results. 
3. Results 
3.1. Criteria and weighting 
The PCI set was organized into five principles that included 12 criteria and 27 
indicators (see Table 1), covered three dimensions (socioeconomic for P1 and P2, 
institutional for P3 and P4, cultural for P5), and two scales (landowner for P1, P3, 
and P5, indirect beneficiaries for P2 and P4). The indirect beneficiaries are those 
affected by the PSA through employment or changes in local infrastructures and 
land tenure. Cultural impacts on indirect beneficiaries seemed too weak and were 
not included. 
Economic impacts were weighted higher (31% for P1 and 21% for P3) than 
institutional (18% for P2 and 18% for P4) or cultural impacts (13% for P5). The 
impacts on landowners were weighted higher than the impacts on indirect 
beneficiaries. The five criteria receiving more weight were C11 (landowner income, 
17.4% of total weight), C12 (economic risk reduction for landowner, 13.2%), C21 
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(employment), C32 (landowner access to financial and technical support), and C31 
(legalization of land tenure).  
3.2. Impact valuation by different approaches  
As expected, the total impact increased from conservative to liberal approaches; 
the conservative approach was highly negative and the liberal approach was highly 
positive. Even for conservative approaches, the institutional impacts on 
organizations (P4) and the cultural impacts on beneficiaries (P5) were positive. For 
balanced approaches (α=0), total impact was positive and only principle P1 showed 




Fig.4. Impact valuation by different approaches (error bars represent the standard 




Comparing the different approaches revealed that only five criteria always remained 
positive: C31 (legalization of land title), C42 (strengthening NGOs), C43 (law 
enforcement), C51 (landowner awareness of ecosystem services), and C52 (inciting 
the beneficiary to protect forest resources). Only one criterion always remained 
negative: C22 (social impacts of land concentration).  
3.3. Landowner's socioeconomic well being Principle 
P1 (landowner's socioeconomic well being) was the only principle with a negative 
evaluation by a balanced approach. The impact differed according to social class: 
positive for upper class and negative for three other socioeconomic classes (small 
farmers: negative, working class: negative, and agribusinesses: moderately 
negative). The two criteria C11 and C12 were not significantly different from zero 
because their compounding indicators reached contrasted values. Indicator I111 
(impacts on short-term income) was significantly negative in the whole sample and 
differed between upper class (null) and working class (very negative). Even though 
the payment was meant to cover only part of the reforestation costs, 60% of the 
landowners were disappointed because the payment did not compensate costs. 
Indicator I112 (impact on medium and longterm income) differed between upper 
class (very positive) and three other groups: small farmers (very negative), 
working class (negative), and agribusinesses (negative). Large farmers (positive) 
were different from small farmers (very negative). A majority of landowners (71%) 
perceived long-term reforestation to be associated with financial benefits. The 
remaining 29% cited uncertainties regarding wood prices and quality of future 
harvests. 
Indicator I121 (diversification of activities) was very positive and without significant 
difference between landowner groups. Forty-one percent of the landowners started 
new activities as a consequence of reforestation under the PSA, for example small 
sawmills or transportation businesses. Indicator I122 (beneficiary credibility when 
soliciting credit) was moderately positive and higher for large farmers (positive) 
than for medium farmers (moderately negative). According to 38% of landowners, 
banks do not consider reforestation as a loan guarantee.4 Indicator I123 (decreased 
economic vulnerability because of increased assets and regular payments) was not 
significant. Seventy-one percent of landowners were satisfied with the regularity of 
payments, but payment and reforestation did not create a security asset. Indicator 
I124 (marketing) was highly negative, without discrimination between groups. No 
producers had sold products from the final harvest, but almost all landowners had 







diameter products from thinning had trouble finding a buyer or were disappointed 
by prices. 
3.4. Indirect beneficiaries' socioeconomic well being 
The impact on socioeconomic well being of indirect beneficiaries (P2) was 
moderately positive in the whole sample and better for small farmers (positive) or 
employees (moderately positive) than for upper class landowners (moderately 
negative). The impact on employment (C21) was very positive. Within this criterion, 
the strongest impact was on the creation of jobs for product transportation and 
transformation (I213, highly positive). The impact on the number of farm workers 
(I211) was also positive whereas the impact on work conditions (I212) was null. 
Fifty-one percent of the landowners thought that reforestation, including product 
transportation or transformation, created additional jobs compared to livestock 
breeding, 16% thought the contrary, and 33% did not see any change.  
The PSA has induced land concentration, considered here as a negative impact 
because it may bring about social disparities, conflicts, and forced migration. The 
impact on land concentration (C22) was stronger for upper class landowners, small 
farmers, and working class landowners. Although impact on land concentration was 
significant (I221, negative), conflicts and induced migration were insignificant 
(I222). Twenty-seven percent of landowners had bought more land for 
reforestation. Interviews with local organizations confirmed that some rich 
landowners or companies had bought land for reforestation.  
Criterion C23 regarding impacts on area social and economic conditions was not 
significant, nor were the corresponding indicators I231 (social infrastructure) and 
I232 (other productive activities). According to the majority of landowners and 
organization representatives, reforestation had not induced regional changes 
because it is a minor activity compared to agriculture.  
3.5. Relationships between the landowner and institutions  
The impact on the relationships between the landowner and institutions (land 
tenure institutions, local and national organizations) was positive (P3), especially 
for landowners applying to the PSA through a local NGO. Criterion C31 (land title 
legalization) was moderately positive and differed between small farmers (positive) 
and agribusinesses (null). For 92% of landowners, the PSA had no impact on 
legalization because they had already regularized their land titles before applying to 
the PSA. The same results were found for the two indicators I311 (motivation of the 
beneficiary to regularize land tenure and get titles) and I312 (protection of 
beneficiary rights). The 8% of landowners that regularized their land title with the 
PSA felt their rights were more protected in case of settler encroachment. 
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Criterion C32 (relationships between landowners and local organizations) was 
positive, especially for landowners applying to the PSA through a local NGO and for 
small farms, for whom the impact was very positive and significantly different from 
other groups. The first indicator I321 (possibility of a beneficiary to request and 
receive support from local and national organizations) was highly positive. The vast 
majority (84%) of landowners requested support from organizations related to the 
PSA at least once, and received a good response. The second indicator I322 
(reduction of conflictive situations between the beneficiary and organizations) was 
negative. Sixty-two percent of landowners considered long-term restrictions 
regarding land-use change under PSA contracts a potential source of conflict with 
the organizations involved. Moreover, most landowners (89%) thought another 
source of conflict was the too low payment. 
3.6. Forestry sector institutions  
The impact on strengthening forestry sector institutions (P4) was highly positive, 
especially regarding NGOs and law enforcement and to a lesser extent for public 
organizations. The impact was moderately positive on public forestry organizations 
(C41), as the PSA had not helped these organizations receive additional funds 
(I412, not significant), even if it had contributed to improving human capacities and 
physical infrastructure (I411, positive). Representatives from public forestry 
organizations said that the lack of budget and materials from the PSA impeded the 
development of capacities and better services. The impact was highly positive on 
NGOs (C42) and both indicators related to this criterion were highly positive. The 
difference between NGOs and public sector institutions is that NGOs do receive a 
fee from the payments, while public sector institutions do not receive additional 
funds to manage PSA. Stakeholders thought that the NGOs were incited to provide 
good services as they received a share of the PSA payment. The impact was also 
highly positive on law enforcement (C43) because the PSA forced stakeholders to 
respect the law (I431, highly positive) and facilitated law enforcement monitoring 
(I432, highly positive). Civil servants of the Ministry of Environment regional offices 
said that they monitor law enforcement when they visit PSA farms.  
3.7. Cultural impacts  
The cultural impacts were very positive (P5), without significant differences 
between groups. Reforestation and the PSA raised beneficiary awareness about 
forest ecosystems goods and services (C51, very positive), especially for farmers 
(highly positive). Satisfaction increased with regard to forest ecosystems goods and 
services (I511, very positive) and promoted the adoption of sustainable practices 
by the beneficiary (I512, very positive), especially for large farmers and 
agribusinesses. Even though most landowners had a negative feeling about the 
economic benefits of reforestation, 57% had a positive perception of the 
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environmental benefits. Sixty-five percent of landowners had implemented 
measures for conserving biodiversity, ecosystems or water, after they entered in 
the PSA program.  
The PSA and reforestation also incited the beneficiaries to protect forest resources 
(C52, very positive), especially for farmers and agribusinesses (very positive) 
compared to upper class landowners (null). The PSA motivated the beneficiaries to 
replant after harvesting, even without payment (I521, very positive), especially for 
the landowners that applied to the PSA through a local NGO. It also incited 
landowners to invest time and money in the protection of forest resources (I522, 
positive). Fifty-seven percent of landowners said they would continue with 
reforestation even without receiving PSA funding. The commitment of landowners 
to protecting forest resources (criterion C52 and its indicators) was significantly 
correlated with two other criteria: C12 (reduction of economic risk) and C32 
(financial and technical support by organizations).  
3.8. Sensitivity analysis  
Changes in the weights hardly affected the results (see Fig. 4 where error bars 
represent the standard deviation of the value during 100 repetitions). For instance, 
the total impact value was 0.37 on average (positive impact) with a standard 
deviation of 0.07 (19% of the average). The extreme values were 0.19 (moderately 
positive) and 0.52 (very positive). 
4. Discussion  
The method used revealed the impact of payment for environmental services on 
local development, considering various dimensions (socioeconomic, institutional, 
and cultural) as well as distinct scales (landowner and indirect beneficiary). It is 
important to consider non-market benefits in evaluating impacts (Lipper and 
Cavatassi, 2004). Reducing the study to only the socioeconomic impacts on 
landowners would have drawn a negative portrait of the PSA, as one of the worst 
impacts was on landowners' short-term incomes and the more positive impacts 
were observed in the institutional and cultural aspects.  
On average, the aggregated impact of the PSA was positive with a balanced 
evaluation approach and consistent with most studies conducted in Costa Rica 
(Miranda et al., 2004). The negative socioeconomic impacts on landowners seemed 
to be the major pitfall of the PSA for reforestation. Landowners said that the 
payment did not sufficiently compensate for reforestation and opportunity costs. 
Using secondary data from local organizations, we estimated that, in the first year, 
reforestation represents a further investment of 200 US$/ha in addition to the PSA 
payment. In the following years, reforestation costs were compensated by 
payments. The loss of incomes due to abandonment of pasture averaged 375 
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US$/ha/year. However, this land opportunity cost varied widely due to natural and 
socioeconomic conditions.  
Landowners without productive farm activities did not suffer loss of income when 
entering into the PSA. That finding explained why the impact on short-term income 
was null for upper class landowners and negative for small farmers, working class 
landowners, and agribusinesses. Many upper class landowners used their farm for 
recreation purposes and wanted to reforest for scenic beauty. Others wanted to 
build reforestation capital or start a productive activity that did not require a 
permanent presence. The PSA allowed these landowners to achieve their plans at 
lower costs.  
Impacts on mid- and long-term income were negative for small farmers and the 
working class and very positive for upper class landowners, who may consider 
reforestation as an investment. Landowners with negative perceptions may lack 
information on income generated by plantation harvest. The negative impact may 
also reflect a strong preference for present incomes. Our results differed from other 
studies concluding on positive impacts on incomes, but dealing with the PSA applied 
to forest conservation (Ortiz Malavasi et al., 2003; Miranda et al., 2003). Forest 
conservation under PSA induces payment gains and opportunity costs (potential 
loss of income from wood harvesting) but impacts are often evaluated positively 
because opportunity costs are ignored, even though they can be higher than the 
payments (Wunder, 2005).  
The initial investment for reforestation, as well as transaction costs and other 
information or skill barriers, are major hindrances to poor landowner participation. 
In addition, the majority of landowners were disappointed by the sale of the first 
thinning products, because the Costa Rican reforestation product market is not well 
developed. The lack of information about prices or wood quality technical 
specifications also reduced profits. The support of local organizations was essential 
as almost no farmer had experience in reforestation before starting with the PSA. 
An important side-impact on the socioeconomic wellbeing of landowners was the 
diversification of livelihoods, also reported in other countries (Grieg-Gran and Bann, 
2003) and in Costa Rica, where landowners see the PSA as an opportunity to realize 
new economic activities, such as ecotourism or environmental education (Miranda 
et al., 2003).  
Indirect stakeholders benefited positively from employment creation in the 
plantation and in the chain of value of wood products, especially with plantations by 
agribusinesses, which generally hired more workers than small farmers. 
Reforestation is labor-intensive: 1 ha of reforestation may generate 300 days of 
work per rotation, including the wood chain (Arias, 2004). In contrast, studies on 
PSA applied to forest conservation reported its impact to be neutral in terms of 
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employment in marginal areas and negative in other areas (Ortiz Malavasi et al., 
2003). Under forest conservation, logging-company workers or charcoal makers 
may lose their jobs (Wunder, 2005).  
Negative impacts were observed with land concentration. Richer landowners and 
companies reforesting for profit were more likely to buy land and cause land 
concentration problems than farmers whose livelihoods depend on farm activities. 
Impacts on infrastructure or service provisions (e.g. roads, schools, health centers, 
or water supply) were not significant because reforestation is a minor activity in the 
area, as in other Costa Rican areas (Miranda et al., 2003).  
The PSA contributed to improving relationship between landowners and institutions. 
Legalization of land title was only moderately improved by the PSA because most 
landowners already had legal titles. The PSA moderately improved land tenure 
security, but to a lesser extent than in other Latin American countries (Rosa et al., 
2003; Wunder, 2005). The land title requisite for PSA applications is generally 
analyzed as positive if it promotes legalization and provides better landowner 
security, but it may limit the role of PSA in poverty alleviation, as many poor people 
do not own their lands (Wunder, 2005).  
The support provided by local organizations to landowners under the PSA is another 
very positive impact. Contacts between landowners and local organizations facilitate 
capacity building and information dissemination, even regarding other businesses 
(Wunder, 2005). Potential conflicts between landowners and Fonafifo were 
identified, especially regarding the imposed land-use change restrictions, which had 
been misunderstood by some landowners when entering in the PSA. One landowner 
felt he was “trapped” by the implications of the PSA contract as he desired to 
transform the reforested land into another use. The payment level was also a 
source of discontent. However, this argument must be analyzed with caution as 
landowners may strategically argue in order to push for an increased payment 
(Echavarría et al., 2004).  
The PSA contributed to strengthening the forestry sector institutions (P4). Other 
studies found that institutional innovation and de-bureaucratization were necessary 
for developing and implementing the PSA (Miranda et al., 2003). Some NGOs 
benefited from wide recognition in Costa Rica and abroad for their contributions to 
the implementation of the innovative PSA mechanism.  
The PSA also increased law enforcement by facilitating monitoring and improving 
landowner awareness. The PSA had very positive impacts on landowner perceptions 
of environment or forest and incited forest protection. It was difficult to distinguish 
the impacts of the PSA from the effects of Costa Rican environmental education 
programs. However, changes in the perceptions of reforestation are probably due to 
the PSA because the landowners had not reforested prior to the PSA. Local 
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organizations played an important role in providing information and organizing 
capacity building for landowners. In other locations throughout Costa Rica, the PSA 
provided training sessions, environmental education, and new forest and farm 
management knowledge (Miranda et al., 2003).  
5. Conclusion  
Our evaluation of the PSA applied to reforestation is globally positive; the negative 
economic impacts are balanced by the positive institutional and cultural impacts. 
The impact on local development depends on the composition of the set of 
beneficiaries (Pagiola et al., 2005). In other places in Costa Rica, for instance in the 
Virilla watershed (Miranda et al., 2003), the large majority of landowners receiving 
PSA are upper class and do not depend on the farm for their livelihoods. In our 
sample, the impacts of the PSA on the poorest landowners (small farmers and 
working class landowners) were notably positive in most dimensions, except 
regarding income. On the contrary, the impacts were often null for upper class 
landowners and in some cases, such as land concentration, negative.  
The best option for enhancing local development impacts would be to focus the PSA 
on the poorest landowners. However, the major problem is that the incomes of the 
poorest landowners, especially their short-term incomes, decreased as a 
consequence of reforestation. This problem may engender negative outcomes and 
reduce the participation of the poorest landowners. Proactive effortsmust bemade 
to ease the participation of less educated and poorer applicants for the PSA to be 
used as an instrument of poverty reduction. To improve income impacts, additional 
support could be provided to the poorest landowners when reforesting under the 
PSA. This could be done through additional financial incentives, such as advance 
payments for wood purchase, implemented by Fundecor in Costa Rica.  
The strongest positive impacts were for landowners applying to the PSA through a 
local NGO. These organizations provided services to the landowners beyond the 
payment that partly explain the positive impact. The organizations also reduced 
transaction costs and paperwork, so that less educated and poor landowners could 
participate in the PSA. However, this positive impact cannot necessarily be 
generalized to other cases because of the specificities of two local organizations in 
Central and Northern Costa Rica (Fundecor and Codeforsa). They are locally and 
internationally well-known and respected for their capacity to adapt to changing 
legal and economic conditions, to generate new technical knowledge, and to create 
innovative approaches for protecting or enhancing forest resources (Camacho et al., 
2002). Many positive aspects of the PSA applied to reforestation are due to the 
productive nature of activities. Compared to payment for forest conservation or 
other economically reducing activities, the impacts of reforestation on employment 
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and long-term income are better (Pagiola et al., 2005). The impacts on incomes 
depend on the existence of timber markets and the capacity of landowners to 
negotiate prices. As incentives to reforestation prior to the PSA ended in failure 
because of a lack of markets for timber, special attention should be given to 
marketing issues.  
The PES programs applied to reforestation are not a panacea for local development 
problems but they may have positive impacts on various dimensions of sustainable 
development. They may promote the introduction of trees in the landscapes and 
provide goods and services for local communities. They may also provide more 
environmental awareness in the population, more diversification of the local 
economy, and stronger institutions. For impacts to be positive, the PES programs 
should involve and support small landowners. However, this may increase the 
complexity of PES programs, raise transaction costs, and reduce the total supply of 
environmental services. As mentioned by other authors (Kosoy et al., 2007), a 
trade-off must be found between the environmental and social goals in PES 
programs.  
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